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DISCRIMINATIO

May Private Individuals Sue
a State That Establishes
English-Only Policies?
by Jay E. Grenig
PREVIEW of United States Supreme Court Cases, pages 176-180. © 2000 American Bar Association.

provided that English is the official
language of the state of Alabama.

Jay E. Grenig is a professor of law
at Marquette University Law
School in Milwaukee, Wis.;
jgrenig@earthlink.net or
(414) 288-5377. He is a co-author
of West's FederalJury Practice
and Instructions.

About one year later, the
Department adopted an Englishonly policy, requiring that all
portions of the driver's license
examination process, including the
written examination, be administered in English only. The policy
officially forbade the use of interpreters, translation dictionaries,
and other interpretive aids. The
Department's official policy still provides special accommodations for
illiterate, hearing-impaired, deaf,
and disabled applicants. The
Department also permits nonEnglish speaking drivers from other
states and foreign countries to
exchange valid out-of-state licenses
for an Alabama license without taking the written examination.

Editor's Note: The respondent's
brief in this case was not available
by PREVIEW's deadline.
ISSUE
When Congress enacted Section 602
of Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of
1964, did it intend to authorize
individuals to bring a private action
against states under disparate
impact regulations promulgated
by federal agencies pursuant to
Title VI?

After the new policy was implemented, the Alabama Attorney
General issued an opinion concluding that Amendment 509 requires

FACTS
Alabama has historically administered its driver's license examination in a number of foreign languages. From the 1970s to 1991, the
Alabama Department of Public
Safety ("Department") administered
the examination in at least 14 foreign languages, including Spanish,
Korean, Farsi, Cambodian, German,
Laotian, Greek, Arabic, French,
Japanese, Polish, Thai, and
Vietnamese. On July 13, 1990, an
English-only amendment to the
Alabama Constitution (Amendment
509) was ratified. That amendment
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all applicants for driver's licenses to
take the examination in English.
The opinion acknowledged that the
English-only policy "might be a violation of Title VI of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964," but that considerations of safety and integrity of the
licensing process would support a
requirement that the driver's license
examinations be given in English.
In December 1996, Martha Sandoval
filed a class action suit in the U.S.
District Court for the Middle District
of Alabama against the Department
and its director on behalf of herself
and others similarly situated. She
claimed that the English-only policy
constituted discrimination on the
basis of national origin in violation
of Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of
1964 (42 U.S.C. § 2000d to 2000d4) and its implementing regulations,
as well as the equal protection
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States
Constitution.
After a trial without a jury, the district court entered a permanent
injunction prohibiting the
Department's enforcement of the
policy and ordered the Department
to make reasonable accommodations for non-English speakers who
applied for a driver's license. 7
F.Supp.2d 1234 (M.D.Ala. 1996).
The district court found that the
policy was adopted as a pretext
for discrimination and that the
Department had intentionally
discriminated on the basis of
national origin.
The Department appealed the judgment to the U.S. Court of Appeals
for the Eleventh Circuit. The
Department argued that the lawsuit
was barred by the Eleventh
Amendment, that Section 602 of
Title VI does not contain an implied
private cause of action and that an
English-language policy cannot con-

stitute unlawful national original
discrimination as a matter of law.
Affirming the district court, the
Eleventh Circuit held that there is
an implied private cause of action
under Title VI of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964 to enforce federal regulations prohibiting disparate-impact
discrimination against statutorily
protected groups. 211 F.3d 133
(11th Cir. 2000). Noting that
Sandoval had brought a disparateimpact case, the court explained
that she must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that a facially
neutral practice has a disproportionate adverse effect on a group protected by Title VI. Once a prima
facie showing is made, the court
said, the Department must prove
that a substantial justification exists
for the challenged practice. The
court stated that if the Department
meets this burden, Sandoval may
still prevail by demonstrating that a
comparably effective alternative
practice exists that would result in
less disproportionality, or that the
Department's proffered justification
is a pretext for discrimination.
The Eleventh Circuit concluded that
the Department's policy of administering its driver's license examination only in English had a disparate
impact on the basis of national origin in violation of Title VI. The
court reasoned that the policy
adversely affected non-Englishspeaking residents in the form of
lost opportunities, social services,
and other quality of life pursuits,
noting that the vast majority of residents who could not obtain a
license were from a country other
than the United States. The
Eleventh Circuit pointed out that
the Department made special examination accommodations for other
statutorily protected groups such
as hearing-impaired, illiterate, and
disabled residents.

In holding that Title VI creates a
private implied cause of action
against states to enforce the disparate impact regulations promulgated under Section 602, the
Eleventh Circuit relied on the
Supreme Court's decisions in Lau v.
Nichols, 518 U.S. 187 (1996) and
GuardiansAss'n v. Civil Service
Comm'n, 63 U.S. 582 (1983).
According to the Eleventh Circuit,
the Supreme Court's decisions in
Lau, Guardians,and Alexander,
although not squarely addressing
the issue, logically supported an
implied private cause of action
under Section 602.
The Department asked the U.S.
Supreme Court to review the
Eleventh Circuit's decision. The
Supreme Court granted the
Department's petition for a writ of
certiorari. 121 S.Ct. 28 (2000).
CASE ANALYSIS
Section 601 of Title VI of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 (42 U.S.C. §
2000d) prohibits any recipient of
federal financial assistance from discriminating on the basis of race,
color, or national origin in any federally funded program. The
Supreme Court has recognized an
implied private cause of action to
enforce Section 601. See Alexander
v. Choate, 469 U.S. 287, 293-94
(1985); GuardiansAss'n v. Civil
Service Comm'n, 63 U.S. 582, 607
n.27 (1983).
Section 602 of Title VI authorizes
federal agencies to promulgate rules
and regulations effectuating Title VI.
The section contains three essential
parts. The first part delegates to federal agencies rule-making authority
to effectuate Section 601. The second part provides agency guidelines
for obtaining compliance with
Section 601 and states that compliance may be effected by termination of funding or by any other
(Continued on Page 178)
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means authorized by law. The third
part establishes a procedural rule
for determining noncompliance,
including notice to the state agency,
a requirement that the federal
agency first seek voluntary compliance and a reporting mechanism for
alerting Congress that a federal
agency is considering termination of
federal funding. There is no express
provision in either Section 601 or
Section 602 for an independent private-party enforcement action.
While Section 601 requires a plaintiff to establish the funding recipient's discriminatory intent, regulations promulgated by the U.S.
Department of Justice and the U.S.
Department of Transportation prohibit funding recipients from taking
any action that results in a disparate impact or produces discriminatory effects on the basis of race,
color, or national origin. The U.S.
Department of Transportation has
promulgated such regulations. The
parties concede that the Alabama
Department of Public Safety is subject to these regulations and that
the U.S. Department of Transportation and the U.S. Department of
Justice may enforce these regulations through proceedings to terminate federal funding or to discontinue financial assistance.
The parties disagree whether an
individual may enforce these
agency regulations without express
statutory authorization. Sandoval
relies on decisions in the Eleventh
Circuit and in seven other circuits
that found an implied right of private action in Section 602 cases.
Sandoval also contends that
Supreme Court cases, while not
directly addressing the point,
have indicated that there is a right
to a private action for violation of
regulations promulgated under
Section. 602.

On the other hand, Alexander
argues that the Supreme Court in
United States v. Fordice overruled
the other Supreme Court cases
relied on by Sandoval. According to
the Department, in order to create a
private cause of action against states
in the context of legislation such as
Title VI, Congress's intent must be
"unambiguously" expressed in the
language of the statute. It is the
Department's position that Title VI
does not meet this "clear statement" requirement.
The Department stresses that
Section 601 covers only intentional
discrimination and not disparate
impact claims. It asserts that
Section 601 does not authorize private individuals, as opposed to the
federal government, to enforce compliance with the section's requirements. With respect to Section 602,
the Department argues that it does
not create any rights at all but
merely delegates rule-making
authority to federal agencies to
effectuate the anti-discrimination
provisions of Section 601. It is the
Department's position that this
"unremarkable grant of authority"
does not authorize federal agencies
to make impermissible by regulation
what Congress has made permissible by statute.
According to the Department, the
Supreme Court's Title VI decisions
do not support a contrary analysis.
The Department explains that in
Lau, the Supreme Court assumed
that Section 601 barred disparateeffect as well as intentional-discrimination claims. Since then, the
Department says that the Court has
made clear that Section 601 proscribes only what the Fourteenth
Amendment proscribes-a standard
that does not cover disparate impact
claims.
The Department claims that Section
602 does not establish a different

standard of care from Section 601
but merely allows federal agencies
to "effectuate" Section 601 by promulgating regulations. According to
the Department, Section 601 does
not authorize federal agencies to
create rules barring disparate effects
arising from generally applicable
state programs that occur "merely
in spite of," rather than "because
of," an individual's national origin.
The Department asserts that an
effort to bar disparate effects arising
from Title VI would not effectuate
the objectives of Title VI but would
rewrite them. The Department
points out that, in other statutory
settings, such as the Americans with
Disabilities Act, when Congress has
intended to apply a disparateimpact standard, it has specifically
created disparate impact standards.
It is the Department's position that
Section 602 does not offer the
slightest indication that Congress
intended private parties to carry out
the enforcement of the regulations.
The Department argues that all
efforts to bring states into compliance with Section 601 must follow a
detailed procedure established by
Section 602. The Department contends that Congress did not contemplate that, in addition to a suspension of funding after a "hearing" or
some other procedure implemented
by the pertinent federal agency,
there would also be private enforcement actions premised exclusively
on agency regulations. The
Department stresses that Section
602 provides that no enforcement
action shall be taken until the
department or agency concerned
has advised the appropriate person
or persons of the failure to comply
with the requirement and has determined that compliance cannot be
secured by voluntary means.
Pointing out that the issue is
whether there is an implied private
right of action under Section 602,
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the Department states that it is not
necessary for the Supreme Court to
invalidate the disparate-impact regulations in order to reject
Sandoval's claim. The Department
acknowledges that the regulations
might be enforced by executive
branch agencies following the extensive procedural protections
Congress enacted for enforcement
of Title VI.
Under the spending clause of the
U.S. Constitution (Art. I, § 8),
Congress has the authority to attach
conditions on the receipt of federal
funds. South Dakota v. Dole, 483
U.S. 203 (1987). Because Congress
may attach conditions on the
receipt of federal funds, it may use
this authority to induce states to
establish programs that it could
not otherwise compel them to
enact. Generally, the states are
given the choice of complying with
the conditions set forth in the legislation or forgoing the benefits of
federal funding.
In Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66 (1975),
the Supreme Court held that a
statute that does not explicitly provide a private right of action may
nevertheless employ such a remedy
in certain circumstances. To create
a private cause of action against
states in the context of spending
clause legislation, the Supreme
Court has held that Congress' intent
must be unambiguously expressed
in the language of the statute. See,
e.g., South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S.
203 (1987); PennhurstState School
& Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1
(1981).
The Eleventh Circuit has recognized
an implied private cause of action to
enforce disparate-impact regulations
under Section 602 Title VI in three
other cases in addition to the
Sandoval case. See Burton v. City of
Belle Glade, 178 F.3d 1175 (11th
Cir. 1999); Elston v. Talladega

County Bd. of Educ., 997 F.2d 1394
(11th Cir. 1993); Georgia State
Conference of Branches of NAACP
v. Georgia, 775 F.2d 1403 (11th Cir.
1985). Seven other circuits have
suggested that an implied private
cause of action may exist under
Section 602. Latinos Unidos De
Chelsea v. Secretary of Housing &
Development, 799 F.2d 744, 785
n.20 (1st Cir. 1986); New York
Urban League, Inc. v. New York, 71
F.3d 1031 (2d Cir.1995); Castenada
by Castenadav. Pickard, 781 F.2d
456, 465 n.11 (5th Cir. 1986);
David K. v. Lane, 839 F.2d 1265
(7th Cir.1988); Buchanan v. City of
Bolivar, 99 F.3d 1352 (6th Cir.
1996); Larry P by Lucille P v. Riles,
793 F.2d 969 (9th Cir. 1984);
Villanueva v. Carere, 85 F.3d 481
(10th Cir. 1996). However, of these
circuits, only the Third Circuit has
addressed the issue in detail.
The Supreme Court has not yet
squarely addressed the question of
whether a private action may be
used to enforce Title VI. In Lau v.
Nichols, 518 U.S. 187 (1996), the
Court held that HEW regulations,
promulgated pursuant to Section
602 and establishing a disparateimpact standard, were valid interpretations of Title VI. However, later
Supreme Court decisions have cast
doubt on the continued validity of
Lau and indicate that Title VI must
be held to proscribe only those
racial classifications that would violate the equal protection clause.
See, e.g., United States v. Fordice,
505 U.S. 717 (1992); Guardians
Ass'n v. Civil Service Comm'n, 63
U.S. 582 (1983); Univ. of California
Regents v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265
(1978). Further, the Supreme Court
has held that the equal protection
clause bans only intentional discrimination and not disparateimpact discrimination. Washington
v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976).

GuardiansAss'n v. Civil Service
Comm'n, 63 U.S. 582 (1983), was a
decision with six separate opinions.
The lower court had rejected the
plaintiffs' claim that the New York
City police department's entry-level
written examination had a discriminatory impact on them, and they
filed suit on that basis under Title
VI and its implementing regulations.
The Second Circuit rejected the
claim on the theory that Title VI
required proof of discriminatory
intent. Five justices affirmed the
decision in separate opinions and
on a variety of grounds. Justices
White and Rehnquist expressed the
view that there was only a limited
cause of action to enforce Title VI
regulations, reasoning that relief in
private disparate impact actions
should be limited to declaratory and
injunctive relief. Justice Powell and
Chief Justice Burger concurred in
the judgment, concluding that no
private right of action to enforce the
regulations could be implied. Justice
O'Connor concurred in the judgment on the ground that an administrative agency could not create a
disparate-impact cause of action
under Title VI.
Other Supreme Court cases interpreting Section 504 of the
Rehabilitation Act and Title IX have
implied private rights of action. See,
e.g., Alexander v. Choate, 469 U.S.
287 (1985) (Section 504); Cannon
v. Univ. Chicago, 441 U.S. 677
(1979) (Title IX). However, none of
these cases involved implied private
rights of action premised on agency
regulations.
SIGNIFICANCE
This case presents the Supreme
Court with the opportunity to
directly address the issue of
whether a private cause of action
for disparate impact can be implied
from administrative regulations promulgated pursuant to Title VI. The
(Continued on Page 180)
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issue of the legality of English-only
laws and policies is not directly
before the Supreme Court.
The significance of the issue can be
measured by the large number of
amicus briefs in this case. A decision affirming the Eleventh Circuit's
holding will make it easier for individuals to obtain relief for race,
color, or national origin discrimination under Title VI because it would,
among other things, eliminate the
often difficult burden of proving discriminatory intent. Such a decision
would allow private litigants to
recover monetary damages from
governmental agencies in addition
to exposing these agencies to the
risk of losing their federal funding.
The Eleventh Circuit's decision may
have an impact on other federal
laws and regulations in addition to
Title VI cases. According to one
amicus, unless reversed, the
Eleventh Circuit's decision will have
a profoundly adverse impact on
other programs, such as those
established by the federal environmental statutes and administered
primarily by state regulatory agencies, as well as on such activities as
college admissions, intercollegiate
athletics, and public school funding.

AMIcuS BRIEFS (AS OF
DEC. 11)
In Support of James Alexander,
Director of the Alabama
Department of Public Safety
Pacific Legal Foundation and
Center for Equal Opportunity (John
H. Findley (916) 362-2833)
National Collegiate Athletic
Association (David P. Bruton (215)
988-2700)
Washington Legal Foundation,
Allied Educational Foundation,
Manufacturers Alliance, and U.S.
Representatives Robert Aderholt,
Spencer Bachus, Sonny Callahan,
Terry Everett, and Bob Riley
(Richard A. Samp (202) 588-0302)
National Association of
Manufacturers (Michael W.
Steinberg (202) 467-7141)
Eagle Forum Education & Legal
Defense Fund (Karen Tripp (713)
658-9323)
U.S. English and Beauty
Enterprises (Joseph E. Schmitz
(202) 457-6086)
Robert C. Jubelirer and Matthew
J. Ryan (John P. Krill (717) 2314500)

ATTORNEYS FOR THE
PARTIES
For James Alexander (Jeffrey S.
Sutton (614) 469-3855)
For Martha Sandoval (J. Richard
Cohen (334) 264-0286)

Issue No. 4

